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The current global business climate has seen a heightened 
awareness of the legal framework that surrounds corporations.  
However, outcomes of legal decisions are not often evaluated as to 
their underlying economic rationale.  This paper seeks to 
contribute to this area by attempting to explain real property law in 
Australia, as evidenced by native title judicial decisions, through 
the application of an economic analysis of the law. In analysing 
these theories, the paper concludes that externalities and 
regulation were held to be an important component for economic 
agents within the real property law framework.  
 
 
 The purpose of this paper is to explain real property law in 
Australia, as evidenced by native title judicial decisions, through 
the application of an economic analysis of the law.  Native title law 
has revolutionised the precedent for real property law and 
subsequent property rights in Australia. Native title represents the 
acceptance of indigenous people occupying the Australian land and 
the further recognition of established property rights for the 
indigenous people, if established in the Australian law courts and 
their respective judicial decisions.  Anderson and Grewell (1999) 
define the process of analysing judicial decisions as a bottom-up 
process that means customary, common law property rights that are 
formed over time when conflicts over resource use arise, whereas a 
top-down approach means government-mandated property rights.  
In discussing property rights, what is traded on the economic 
market is not physical entities, but the rights to perform certain 
actions, and the rights which individuals possess are established by 
the legal system (Coase, 1960).  
In considering the economic underpinnings of the judicial 
decisions, the analysis in this paper will specifically probe at 
transaction cost theory and the Coase theorem as posed by Coase 
(1960) and the essay will also seek to address Pigou’s (1932) 
externality effects where the Coase theorem does not appear to 
apply.  As a result of the economic analysis under transaction costs, 
rights and externalities, the paper is classified in the domain of 
welfare economics: welfare economics being the study of 
individual and group utility in an economy (Hartwick & Olewiler, 
1997). The welfare economic analysis of the law has occurred in 
the areas of crime (e.g. Becker, 1968), tort (e.g Posner, 1992) and 
contract (e.g. Trebilcock, 1993).  In investigating the effects on 
individuals and groups as economic agents under the welfare 
paradigm, this paper will argue that the restrictions placed on 
proving the existence of native title is burdensome, because of the 
economic detriment, both negative economic returns and a high 
opportunity cost, associated with such a burden. Furthermore, 
Rubin and Bailey’s (1994) argument that special interest groups 
operate to influence the law to suit their own rent-seeking 
behaviour will not hold for the case of native title judicial decisions 
in Australian property law. 
In considering economic detriment and individual or group utility 
this paper will look at a number of areas.  First, there will be a 
discussion on the theory of economic analysis of law.  Secondly, 
the paper will look at how the economic analysis of law in 
Australia has affected the burden of proof claimants must discharge 
to be successful in an application for native title under Australian 
real property law. Thirdly, the paper will examine the influence 
economic analysis of law has on the denial of real property rights in 
Australia under native title claims.  Lastly, the paper will look at 
the method the Australian courts use to divide real property rights, 
as property is commonly defined as a bundle of rights (Dnes, 1996; 
Hartwick & Olewiler, 1997; Posner, 1992).  It is the concept of 
rights that differs between Coase (1960) and Pigou (1932). 
 
Literature Review 
 Coase (1960) and Pigou (1932) differ in their approaches to an 
economic market and the problem of social cost.  Coase (1960) did 
not think in terms of externalities, but rather considered pollution 
and clean air (or water, forests, wildlife habitat) as conflicting or 
alternative resource uses for which there is competition. Generally, 
Coase’s (1960) approach is accepted to contain two propositions.  
The first proposition is that, when there are zero transactions costs 
and wealth effects, parties will bargain to an efficient outcome.  
The second proposition holds that the same outcome will occur 
regardless of the distribution of property rights.  The latter is 
known as the invariance thesis (see Hylan, Lage & Treglia, 1996).  
Overall, Coase (1960) is proposing a free market approach that is 
dependent on the pricing system for appropriate distribution of 
rights.  
Pigou (1932) essentially argues that a free market is a practical 
norm that is difficult to find and a regulatory framework must be 
utilised.   Pigou (1932) states that the dominant policy approach for 
solving economic problems has been to use government's power to 
tax and regulate.  Government intervention is seen as necessary 
when externalities exist in a market.  The term externality refers to 
an economic concept asserting that inefficiencies result when costs 
incurred and benefits received by individuals involved in an 
economic transaction or activity do not incorporate all the costs and 
benefits to society (Anderson, 2000).  Therefore, a transaction that 
seems efficient to the individual parties to a transaction may really 
be inefficient from the viewpoint of society because of the 





Economic Analysis of Law 
 The economic analysis of law is the extension and application of 
traditional economic theory to the law, in this case Coase (1960) 
and Pigou (1932), and relies heavily on microeconomic constructs 
(Posner, 1992; Cooter & Ulen, 1997; Wittman, 2003).  Resource 
utilisation is an important aspect of traditional economic theory and 
that markets clear (Robbins, 1935).  Conflicting uses, such as in the 
case of air pollution, can be resolved through bargaining, if well-
defined property rights specify who has the right to use the 
resources and therein derive value from them (Coase, 1960).  
However in considering a legal analysis, the implication is that 
there are some market imperfections necessitating intervention.  
This means that the analysis merges into a regulatory economic 
paradigm (see Stigler, 1971; Peacock & Rowley, 1972; Hartwick & 
Olewiler, 1997), and support for Pigou’s (1932) arguments of 
externalities and intervention in an imperfect market need to be 
considered. 
 A leading cause of market failure is the presence of significant 
externalities. As a result competitive equilibrium does not exist, 
and the outcome is not Pareto optimal.  For Pigou (1932) the 
typical response to this lack of optimality is for the government to 
step in and introduce corrective policy, usually in the form of taxes 
and subsidies.  Coase supporters view this differently.  They have 
contended that, despite externalities, unrestrained bargaining and 
contracting ought to be sufficient to generate an efficient outcome, 
even if formal markets fail, the invisible hand nevertheless 
succeeds, and outside intervention or design is not required. 
(Maskin, 1994) 
 Unrestrained bargaining by economic agents adheres to economic 
theory in that resources, rights, are finite and scarce (Mansfield and 
Yohe, 2000).  Therefore, resources (renewable and non-renewable) 
must be used efficiently, by ensuring resource allocation is 
maximised.  This means the person who should control the resource 
should be the person with the highest value for that resources use 
(Dnes, 1997), this is best understood and resolved in the Coase 
(1960) framework, wherein these concerns are viewed as a 
competition over conflicting uses for scarce resources (Anderson & 
Grewell, 1999).  Furthermore in this framework a Pareto efficient 
outcome is sought, whereby total social welfare denotes a position 
on the indifference curve where it is not possible to reallocate 
resources and improve the welfare of any one person without 
making at least one other person worse off (Hartwick & Olewiler, 
1997).  This is different to other views (e.g Bentham) whereby 
utility is spread equally amongst economic agents (Hardin, 1996) 
and that transaction costs incorporate social costs (Coase, 1960).  
However if the market fails in allocating resources, then there may 
be a need to rely on a third party, government, and subsequently 
government regulations to facilitate and intervene, to obtain a more 
optimal allocation of resources.  For the case of the paper and the 
analysis of Australian property law and native title claims, the 
resource being distributed is a right to property, either singularly or 
as a bundle of rights. 
 Under Australian law, economic agent protection is provided by 
two complimentary sources: the Australian law courts and the 
doctrine of precedent, bottom-down; or the Parliament at a Federal 
or State level, top-down.  If the Australian law courts are the source 
then property law, law of contract and tortious law can afford 
protection (see Posner, 1998).  These areas of law create, define 
and transfer and protect property rights (Posner, 1998).  When 
property rights in resources and land are well defined and 
protected, it is presumed there is an incentive for people to exploit 
resources efficiently and effectively (Benkler, 2002). 
 Furthermore, the transaction cost of enforcing and regulating 
property rights is lower than the benefit gained by such a process 
(see Coase, 1960; Calabresi & Melamed, 1972; Hartwick & 
Olewiler, 1997).  The implication is that, real property must be 
owned, transferable: to ensure the most efficient user can exploit 
the right or land, and exclusive, to ensure rights in the land are not 
interfered with (Hartwick & Olewiler, 1997), this process is 
sometimes referred to as inalienability of title (Calabresi & 
Melamed, 1972).  Title rights and inalienability can vary over time. 
In an evolutionary economic perspective the theory of property 
rights is dynamic in nature, envisioning the possibility that rights 
can be redefined from period to period as the relative values of 
different economic agents have different uses of land or changes in 
societal values (Jackson, 2003).  
 
Economic Analysis and Australian Common 
Law 
 The economic analysis of law is not a concept, which has been 
explicitly referred to by judges in native title property rights 
decisions in claims in Australian real property law.  Posner (2003) 
concedes that there will be no explicit reference to the economic 
analysis of law; rather it will require academics to learn to seek it 
out below the surface.  Judges in Australian law courts will try to 
maximise economic welfare as an implied consequence and 
intentional endeavour, but not as direct economic policy nor as a 
direct economic institution. 
 
Strict Burden of Proof for Native Title Claims 
Having competing claims on a disputed land area in Australia 
does not only create uncertainty, but is economically detrimental as 
economic agents can not make more accurate decisions about the 
usage of their right.  The focus on competing uses rather than on 
social costs necessitates resolving an important question: who has 
the property rights to a scarce resource?  While free trade and 
competition for resource use resolves which use is valued higher, 
the issue of who actually owns the property right to a scarce 
resource must be resolved.  Thus, the Coasean perspective defines 
economic problems not in terms of externalities, but rather as 
problems brought about by ill-defined property rights (Anderson 
and Grewell, 1999). Demsetz (1964) notes that whether res nullius 
(open access) or private property governs resource use depends on 
the level of benefits expected from the property and the costs of 
monitoring and enforcing the property right by excluding others.  In 
Members of Yorta Yorta v Victoria (2002) 194 ALR 538 (Yorta 
Yorta) a claim was made on 2000 square kilometres of land and 
water along the Murray, Ovens and Goulburn rivers in Victoria and 
New South Wales.  The claim was opposed by nearly three hundred 
parties, which included the New South Wales and Victorian 
Governments, councils, forestry and fishery groups, farmers, 
beekeepers and tourist operators.  The water supply to the towns of 
Albury, Finely, Deneiliquin, Cohuna, Shepparton, Benalla and 
Wangaratta was threatened if native title was recognised over the 
rivers.  Further, the claimants wanted to exclude cattle and logging. 
All parties faced uncertainty regarding the outcome of the claim 
and the effect on them. Furthermore, the transaction cost of 
allocation of the property rights was extremely high. 
 Similarly legal action increased economic agent uncertainty in 
Wilson v Anderson 190 ALR 313 (Wilson).  In Wilson a claim was 
lodged on behalf of the Euaylay-i people for 4107 square 
kilometres of land and increased the transaction cost of legal 
enforcement as well as uncertainty.  The land claimed, Western 
Division, represents 42 per cent of New South Wales and consists 
of 4250 perpetual grazing leases.   
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 The threat of litigation also hinders investment and threatens the 
transferability of land to a more efficient user (see North, 1990).  
The hindering effect of litigation has been referred to as the 
economics of precautions (Cooter, 1985; Brown, 1998). 
Furthermore, leaseholders may have their rights partially 
extinguished.   This affects leaseholder’s ability to invest as their 
property rights may become affected.   With the inability to invest, 
resources are not efficiently maximised.  Expansion becomes 
impeded and new machinery and employees cannot be utilised to 
increase production.  This results in market failure and waste.  To 
prevent the economic turmoil the High Court in Australia has 
imposed a strict burden of proof on all native titleholders.    
 The burden of proof does impede traditional indigenous values.  
Traditionally, for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islanders the 
enforcement of property rights was unnecessary.  Land was 
communal and abundant.   There was no need to have written 
records or fenced property, ownership was evidenced by 
possession.  Acts such as cultivating the land and hunting were 
consistent with possession.  This has led to controversy in the 
Australian law courts regarding native title claims in real property 
rights as possession alone will not be recognised by the Australian 
High Court at common law.  As a result the application of a stricter 
burden of proof results in market imperfection as asymmetrical 
information governs the ability to hold an interest in land 
recognised by the Australian High Court.  
 In order to alleviate the uncertainty associated with asymmetrical 
information regarding traditional values and Australian real 
property law, the High Court of Australia has set a precedent of a 
stricter doctrine of proof.  The Australian High Court in Yorta 
Yorta established a stricter onus of proof on indigenous claimants 
wishing to assert native title rights over a disputed area.   The 
majority judgment in Yorta Yorta held that there must be 
substantial uninterrupted and continued observance or 
acknowledgement of traditional laws and customs since 1788.  In 
addition, the laws and customs must display normative 
characteristics, derived from a system of norms.  If there has been 
an interruption, then native title will become extinguished.  The 
previous legal burden for native title property rights in Australia 
under De Rose v South Australia [2002] FCA 1349 (De Rose); 
Commonwealth v Yamirr (2001) 184 ALR 113 (Yamirr); Fejo v 
NT at 126, were such that it was only necessary to prove 
observance or acknowledgement of traditional indigenous laws and 
customs.  A further qualification, under Mabo and De Rose, was 
that a static lifestyle was not required, whereby the system of norms 
was required to be uninterrupted since 1788, Australian 
sovereignty. Interruptions would cause the extinguishment of the 
native title property right.  While the onus is strict, Yorta Yorta 
decided that there is allowance for some adaptation of traditions 
and customs.   
 However, in De Rose it was deemed that a tradition would not be 
recognised if there were a break with the past rather than 
maintenance of the ways of the past. Again in Yorta Yorta, native 
title was denied on the grounds that the society ceased to exist as 
group, making it impossible for members to acknowledge and 
observe laws and customs.  Further, any attempt to resurrect the 
traditions would be unsuccessful, due to the interruption.    
 
Competing Interest 
 The Australian High Court has been cautious in dividing property 
rights over competing property right claims (commonly referred to 
as land claims).  Concurrent property rights may result in 
inefficient use of resources and affect economic improvements to 
the land (North, 1990).  In considering multiple users there is still a 
competitive market where people bargain for the use of the rights to 
scarce property and competing demands for use of an asset 
(Anderson & Grewell, 1999).  According to the logic of the Coase 
theorem, the important condition is that whoever these owners are, 
public or private, their property rights should be well specified. 
(Jefferson, 1998).  When there are competing claims, the Australian 
Law Courts will not assign and protect the rights of the party who 
values the property the most.  Rather, it will look to the most 
economic viable option.  In most cases, the court will protect the 
current landholder’s property rights to exploit the land and its 
resources for economic gain.  
 In adhering to protection of current right holders it can be seen 
that whether property rights evolve as private or as shared common 
property, definition and enforcement costs are likely to be lower at 
the local level because those involved in the process have more 
incentive and greater ability to economize on expenditures 
(Anderson & Hill, 1983).  There are numerous explanations as to 
this resolution. Individuals at the local level are likely to be more 
culturally homogeneous, and that homogeneity provides norms that 
can help resolve conflicts in closely knit groups (Ellickson, 1991).  
Such social and cultural norms develop over time as efficiency-
enhancing norms replace efficiency-reducing ones and as those 
who disagree with norms move where the norms better fit their 
preferences (Anderson, 1995).  Overall a significant factor is 
cultural homogeneity, as it reduces transaction costs through 
common language that can lower the costs of specifying property 
rights and negotiating over their use (Anderson & McChesney, 
1994). 
 When native title has been proven it will be subject to two further 
qualifications.  Firstly, the use of land must be related to the 
practising of traditional customs.  Secondly, the use of land must 
not interfere with the exploitation of resources.  The rationale 
behind only providing native title holders with minimal rights is 
that if exclusive possession was proven, they would lack the 
expertise and technical skills required to exploit resources, for 
example mining.  Consequently, resources would not be allocated 
efficiently, and wealth would not be maximised it would be wasted.   
 The recognition and extent of competing rights depends on the 
rights granted not the particular lease granted.  In a cross-section of 
Australian High Court decisions, Ward v Western Australia (1998) 
159 ALR 483 (Ward), Wik Peoples v Queensland (1996) 141 ALR 
129 (Wik) and De Rose, pastoral and mining leases can only 
partially extinguish native title rights, and therefore native title 
rights can co-exist with other rights.  Conversely, perpetual leases 
will wholly extinguish native title rights, and the rights of lessees 
remain unhindered as was held in the Wilson decision by the 
Australian High Court.  
 In Ward the rationale for the co-existence of property rights, is 
the assertion that native title claims inevitably consists of a bundle 
of rights.  As a result the High Court of Australia, in the law cases 
of Yamirr and Wik, states that native title rights can be 
extinguished partially, subject to the inconsistency of incidents test.  
Australian real property law under Wik, in consideration of native 
title must compare the legal nature of statutory rights granted (grant 
and the statute it is made under) with the native title rights being 
claimed.  Furthermore in Mabo, native title rights will be 
extinguished when there is an inconsistency with the manner of 
occupation.  The manner of occupation being closely related to the 
existing property right granted to the agent.  
 Applying inconsistency test, leaseholders proprietary rights are 
largely protected.  This was determined in Ward where leaseholders 
maintain rights related to exclusive possession, occupation and use 
and enjoyment of the area, control of access to the area and rights 
to make decisions about the area.  The overall trend is that native 
title rights are residual in nature.  However, Aboriginal and Torres 
Strait Islanders have rights with respect to the observance of 
traditional laws and customs. These rights include the right to have 
access to the claim area; move around the area to hunt, prepare and 
consume food; gather plants for medicinal purposes, can access 
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water so-long as it is not man-made; use timber to construct shelter 
and make weapons and implements and the right to hold meetings 
for religious and ceremonial purposes. 
 However, the division of a bundle of property rights should be 
done with caution as the boundary principle represents a moral 
hazard to the parties.  The boundary principle limits the right to 
subdivide private property into wasteful fragments (Heller, 1999).  
In the United States, the division of property rights has been 
unbundled in a controlled manner allowing continued productivity 
for the use of each right (Rose-Ackerman, 1985).  The trend in 
Australia is towards a controlled assignment of private property 
rights, increasing overall fragmentation of the bundle of rights 
(Heller & Krier, 1999).  If Australian law and policy were to divide 
property rights too far and by too much then this would not be 
economically viable as it would increase transaction costs as a 
result of the assignment process to parties and secondly, rights as a 
resource would no longer have economic value as a result of 
externalities. 
 
Denial of Rights 
 Posner (1998) argues that the denial of a property right can be as 
much an economising device as the creation of one.  Posner (1998) 
also contends that limitation of economic devices can be designed 
to induce the correct level of investment in the exploitation of a 
valuable resource.  The application of Posner’s arguments is that 
the denial of native title rights, under real property law policy, 
becomes a product of economic rational practicability and not an 
issue of racial discrimination.  Broadly, the denial of native title can 
be justified on two grounds: public access and structures. 
 
Public Access 
 Native title will be denied, where rights claimed are over public 
areas, such as waterways and water resources.  The binding 
decision for public access is in the Australian High Court decision 
of Yamirr.  The issue in Yamirr was whether native title could exist 
offshore to include the resources, which were in the seabed and 
subsoils.  The claim was for the ownership, exclusive possession, 
occupation, use, and enjoyment of an area of sea.  In Yamirr it was 
held that native title exists offshore, but not exclusive title.  The 
denial of exclusive rights was grounded on the common law public 
rights of navigation and fishing and innocent passage.  Applying 
the economic analysis of law, granting an exclusive right to a 
valuable public resource could result into a potential quasi-
monopoly and rent seeking behaviour over waters.  This would lead 
to wasted resources and market failure.  This is evidenced in His 
Honour Justice Kirby’s dissenting judgement in Yamirr, where he 
held that exclusive rights existed, and therefore the right to prevent 
fishing, tourism and mining activities around the island.  
 
   Structures 
 Operational inconsistencies are another basis for denying the 
recognition native title rights and were set as a precedent in De 
Rose.  Furthermore De Rose held that native title will be 
extinguished where there have been improvements to the land, for 
example by the construction of homesteads, dams, bores and 
airstrips.  One reason for this denial is that Aboriginal and Torres 
Strait Islanders are no longer able to observe traditional laws and 
customs if there have been improvements.  However, applying an 
economic framework there are two additional reasons.  Firstly, 
native title claimants would receive a benefit, without necessarily 
compensating the previous landholders adequately.  While market 
value or ‘just terms’ is the basis for compensation, it does not 
consider the subjective value of the property.  The person being 
dispossessed may value the property above market value.  For 
example, in Yorta Yorta, a portion of the farmer’s descendants had 
occupied and worked the land continuously since the 1870s.  
Secondly, the land may have moved to the economic agent with the 
highest value for the land.  Therefore if not used efficiently, 
resources would no longer be maximised and the creation of wealth 
becomes stagnant.  To ensure that native title rights do not interfere 
with the rights of leaseholders to use structures, De Rose holds, 
under Australian law that the application of a buffer zone of one 
kilometre radius exists around the structure.  However if there are 
improvements that can be shared, then Mabo allows for shared 
property rights and that native title will not be extinguished.   
 Still there remains the problem of common property rights.  
Gordon (1954), Demesetz (1964), Demesetz (1997) and Furubotn 
and Pejovich (1972) all agree that over exploitation results when 
there is common property as users ignore their impact on other 
users.  This is commonly referred to as the tragedy of the 
commons.  The tragedy of the commons follows Pigou’s 
externality in a negative aspect.  In this situation Coases rights are 
not defined sufficiently to consider the optimum usage or marginal 
benefit. 
 
Implications and Suggestions for Future 
Research 
 In considering Coase (1960) and Pigou (1932) and real property 
law from a bottom-up perspective in Australia a number of trends 
have been outlined in this paper.  Pigou’s (1932) externalities and 
regulation were held to be an important component for economic 
agents within the real property law framework.  Particularly in 
consideration of the burden of proof and certainty regarding 
investment of resources.  Coase’s (1960) transaction costs were 
burdensome in view of the actual process of the claim and the 
outcome of the judicial process.  Furthermore, in dividing rights 
between parties and adhering to the notion of a bundle of rights 
transaction costs were also high but were reduced when a local 
climate of resources had been utilised and when capital investment 
had already occurred.  
 Rights would be divided when the rights of native title claimants 
are not inconsistent with existing rights.  In this situation, the right 
may be considered to have transferred to the user with the highest 
economic value (see Coase, 1960).  At first instance Pigou’s (1932) 
social cost approach would hold however intrinsic value of the right 
is considered and the native title party may move around the area to 
hunt, prepare and consume food; gather plants for medicinal 
purposes, can access water so-long as it is not man-made; use 
timber to construct shelter and make weapons and implements and 
the right to hold meetings for religious and ceremonial purposes, 
when these actions are consistent with traditional customs and 
aboriginal laws. 
 Outright denial of aforementioned rights will occur on two 
grounds.  The first instance is when there is public access to 
consider, here exclusive native title will be denied, where rights 
claimed are over public areas, such as waterways and water 
resources.  In this case a monopoly of the bundle of rights is 
avoided and individual rights can be utilised by more agents.  The 
second instance occurs when there are operational inconsistencies 
are another basis for denying the recognition native title as it may 
interfere with existing investments.  As a result the resource will 
not be used efficiently. 
  
 It can be seen that a number of perspectives can be considered in 
analysing native title and real property law in Australia.  This paper 
did not consider an economic analysis of non-native title claimants.  
The dominant reason being that native title is changing the 
framework of the doctrine of precedent in Australian real property 
law from a bottom-up perspective.  Future studies may also 
contribute further to the economic field of analysing the law by 
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investigating the role of the law courts as an economic institution or 
as an indirect policy maker. 
 
Conclusion 
  This paper has discussed the important implications stemming 
from the economic rationale of real property law in an Australian 
context.  This paper discussed native title judicial decisions, 
through the application of an economic analysis of the law.  
Transaction cost theory, Coase’s theorem and Pigou’s externality 
effect were examined through the economic law literature and 
Australian cases.  In analysing these theories, the paper concluded 
that externalities and regulation were held to be an important 
component for economic agents within the real property law 
framework.  Suggestions for future research were highlighted and 
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